In age of US-China rivalry, supply chain statecraft counts

A man walks along rocks as oil tankers and cargo ships line up in the Strait of Hormuz, seen from Khor Fakkan in the United Arab Emirates on March 11.

Photo: AP Geopolitical competition has long been understood in territorial terms.

Power was measured by control over land, resources and populations.

Rivalry was expressed through military confrontation, alliance formation and the defence of borders.

As economic interdependence deepened in the 20th century, globalisation was seen as an arena within which states competed, but not itself the object of competition.

That assumption no longer holds.

Increasingly, the infrastructure of globalisation is becoming the central arena in which geopolitical rivalry unfolds.

Power is no longer exercised only through territorial control, but through influence over economic systems.

The question is no longer who controls territory, but who controls the flow of economic activity.

This shift has been partly driven by globalisation itself.

As production, transport and finance have become more interconnected, vulnerabilities have multiplied.

Supply dependencies, network concentration and geographic chokepoints have created new forms of leverage, often less visible than military force, but no less consequential.

What is emerging is a distinct mode of statecraft: supply chain statecraft – the use of economic infrastructure as an instrument of geopolitical strategy.

States do not simply seek to strengthen their position, but to shape the environment in which their rivals operate.

Influence is exerted not only by building capacity, but by controlling access, redirecting flows and introducing friction into the networks on which others depend.

Concentrated bauxite and iron ore are seen at the Yantai Port ore terminal in Shandong province on October 29, 2025.

Photo: CFOTO/Future Publishing via Getty Images This shift is already visible.

In the energy sector, sanctions and war have accelerated the fragmentation of global markets.

Discounted supply channels linking sanctioned producers with willing buyers have expanded – such as the flow of discounted oil from Iran, Russia and Venezuela into Asia – operating alongside the formal system with opacity and flexibility.

These arrangements do not replace the global market, but they allow participants to reduce exposure to certain forms of external pressure.

In the industrial sphere, the concentration of processing capacity for critical minerals in a limited number of count

原文链接: 南华早报